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NOTES
SOME LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF
PARKING METERS
FeW and fortunate are the sizeable cities in this country that have
yet to meet the problem of providing sufficient parking places for the
increasing number of automobiles that utilize their streets and highways.' For most cities the problem is an acute one. 2 Some indication
of its perplexity can be ascertained from a glance at the number of
cities that have resorted to traffic commissions, studies and boards to
seek a solution. 3 If there is a solution to this problem, the traffic survey
reports indicate that it lies in more extensive traffic control measures,
4
rigidly enforced.
This note is intended to discuss one mean§ of traffic control-the
parking meter. The first meter was installed in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1935;5 and by 1947, 888 cities6 at one time or another had done
likewise. No attempt will be made herein to evaluate the efficacy, or
prophesy the future, of the parking meter; such questions are for the
traffic engineers and commissions." Instead, this note will consider
only the principal problems and questions that arise from the installation of a parking meter by the state, city or municipality.
Judicial attack upon the legality of the parking meter emanates
generally from two sources, motorists and the owners of land abutting
1. See, e.g., PARKING FOR SMALLER CITIES C. II, IX (Published by Associated
Retailers of Indiana, 1949); McCLINTOCK, STREET TRAFFIC CONTROL 146- 54
(1925); McCRAcKEN, TRAFFIC REGULATION IN SMALL CITIES (1932).
2. BAUER AND COSTELLO, TRANSIT MODERNIZATION AND STREET TRAFFIC CON-

TROL 8-11 (1950).
3. Nashville, Tennessee, as early as 1934 undertook such a survey the result
of which was a series of recommendations, the foremost being to widen the
streets. This met with strong objection from local merchants and taxpayers.
The commission concluded that the only solution was traffic control. See A
TRAFFIC SAFETY SURVEY OF THE CITY OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 66, 83 (1934).
See also EDWARDS AND McCLINTOcK, A TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN FOR KANSAS CITY

(1930); THE PARKING PROBLEM (Published by the Eno Foundation for Highway

Traffic Control, Inc., 1942) (note especially the impressive bibliography, id. at
71-75, as indicative of the municipal concern caused by the parking problem.)
4. See, e.g., BAUER AND COSTELLO, op. cit. supra note 2 at 9-10 (1950); THE
PARKING PROBLEM, Op. cit. supranote 3, at 10, 11, c. VI (1942); A TRAFFIC SAFETY
SURVEY OF THE CITY OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 83 (1934).

5. KANE, FAMOUS FIRST FACTS 330 (1950).
6. PARKING FOR SMALLER CITIES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 69, Table 1, Ap-

pendix C (1949). Compare Table 3, Appendix C, with 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235,
236 n.3 (1947), and 1 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 78-10 (1948).
7. For those interested in the more erudite views expressed, see BAUER AND
COSTELLO, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9 (1950); PARKING FOR SMALLER CITIES, Op.
cit. supra note 1, at 69 (1949); THE PARKING PROBLEM, op. cit. supra note 3, at
45 (1942); Grimes, The Legality of Parking Meter Ordinancesand Permissible
Use of ParkingMeter Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1947).
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the metered streets.8 The motorist contends that the meters violate his
inherent rights to the free and unobstructed use of the highway. The
abutting landowners, on the other hand, assert that their special property rights, 10 such as those of ingress and egress," light and air,12
loading and unloading, 13 and so forth, are infringed.' 4 Either or both
groups can, and often do, assert that the parking meter is in reality a
municipal revenue-raising measure imposed under the guise of the
police power 15 and that the mere delegation of authority to the municipality from the state to control and regulate highways and traffic does
not include the installation of parking meters.16 Further, they question
the delegation of this power by the municipality to its traffic boards or
commissions.17

From this arise three problems that will be dealt with herein. They
8. See, e.g., Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135 (1943);.
Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E.2d 968 (1943); Wilhoit v. City
of Springfield, 273 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.W.2d 95 (1943); M. H. Rhodes v. City of
Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940); People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S.2d 320
(Utica City Ct. 1941); City of -Columbus v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N.E.2d
142 (1940); Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937); Hickey v.
Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945); Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555,
201 S.W.2d 688 (1947); County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va.
381, 3 S.E.2d 631 (1939). Also 1 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE 144, 145 (1948); Notes, 22 IowA L. REv. 713, 714 (1937), 29 VA. L.
REV.

617 (1943). Cf., Grimes, The Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and

Permissible Use of ParkingMeter Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1947).

9. See, e.g., Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943);
Asbell v. Lahan, 158 Fla. 72, 27 So.2d 667 (1946); Stephens v. City of Russell,
306 Ky. 727, 209 S.W.2d 81 (1948); State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97
(1952); Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A.2d 881 (1943);
Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688 (1947).
10. 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORTIONS §§ 1123, 1126 (5th ed. 1911); ELLIOT,
THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS 961 (2d ed. 1900).
11. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.54 (Casner ed., 1952); 3 TIFFANY, REAL

PROPERTY § 927 (3d ed. 1939).
12. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.54 p. 494 (Casner ed., 1952); 3 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1127 (5th ed. 1911); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 927
(3d ed. 1939).
13. Discussed generally in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.54 (Casner ed.,
1952); 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1123, 1125, 1127 (5th ed. 1911);
ELLIOT, THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS 961 (2d ed. 1900); Notes, 22 IOWA L.
REV. 713, 715 (1937), 4 Omo ST. L.J. 198, 203 (1938), 29 VA. L. REV. 617 (1943).
14. For the manner in which the contentions are asserted, see, e.g., Gardner
v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135 (1943); Wilhoit v. City of
Springfield, 273 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.W.2d 95 (1943); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore.
321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945).
15. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673 (1948);
City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 173 Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222 (1952); Bowers v.
City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 626, 9 N.W.2d 889 (1943); Hendricks v. City of
Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940); Wilhoit v. City of Springfield,
273 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.W.2d 95 (1943); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162
P.2d 371 (1945).
16. See Asbell v. Lahan, 158 Fla. 72, 27 So.2d 667 (1946); Ashley v. City of
Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 58 S.E.2d 815 (1950); City of Bloomington v. Wirrick,
381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852 (1942); Miller v. City of Georgetwon, 301 Ky. 241,
191 S.W.2d 403, 406 (1945); Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So.
569 (1940); In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 62 R.I. 347, 5 A.2d
455 (1939).
17. Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171, rehearing denied,
296 N.W. 352 (1940).
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are: the effect of the parking meters upon the inherent rights of the
public to the use of the road; upon the rights of owners of abutting
property; and the legality of the fee or charge imposed along with
meters. Exactitude requires the mention of several other related questions which will be noticed, but not elaborated.

I. RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC TO THE FREE USE OF THE STREETS AND HIGHWAYS
Regardless of how the municipality acquires property for a street or
highway, whether by dedication of the land by the owner to use as a
highway, by prescription or by statutory proceedings under eminent
domain, 8 it is generally said that the fee is in the municipality and the
public acquires a right of user only.' 9 Whether that right of user is
claimed as a legal right to pass and repass or an easement of passage,
the legal result is the same. 20 It is a right which will be protected and
upheld by the courts when unreasonably infringed upon by third
21

persons or the municipality.
It will be observed that the expression "when unreasonably infringed upon" is used to indicate the extent of judicial protection regarding the rights of the public to the free use of the streets. The implication is that reasonable restrictions or regulations upon those rights
will not warrant judicial intervention. There is no doubt that the state
or municipality acting through its police power authority to regulate
and control highways has the right to regulate and controrl them when22
ever public welfare or convenience renders such action necessary.
18. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (Casner ed., 1952); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 596 (3d ed. 1939).

19. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 482-497 (Casner ed., 1952); 3 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1797 (1911); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 596 (3d ed.
1939). For an excellent discussion of the abutting property owners rights, see
In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E.2d 179 (1937). For the interesting but confusing situation of the law in Ohio, see Hamilton, Glendale &
Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N.E. 1011, 1014 (1902)
(saying that abutting owner has only right of ingress and egress); Smith v.
Central Power Co., 103 Ohio St. 681, 137 N.E. 159, 162 (1921) (saying abutting
owner now has right to light and air); Eisenmann v. Tester, 191 N.E. 839, 934:
(Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (holding that abutting landowner has right to use the
street for loading and unloading free from legislative regulation without
compensation).
20. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 492 (Casner ed., 1952) (easement of pass-

age); 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1797 (5th ed. 1911).
21. E.g., Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Brodkey v.
Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940); M. H. Rhodes v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940); Bergen v. Littman, 193 Misc. 40, 85.
N.Y.S.2d 48 (1948); Wenzel v. Duncan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Eisenmann v. Tester, 47 Ohio App. 275, 191 N.E. 839 (1934); Ex parte Duncan, 179,
Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937).

See also, 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

§ 1123 (5th ed. 1911); 10 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS § 30.68 (3d ed..
1949).
22. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 452, 47 N.E.2d 968 (1943);In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E.2d 179 (1937); City of Claytonv. Nemours, 353 Mo. 61, 182 S.W.2d 57 (1944); M. H. Rhodes v. City of Raleigh,
217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940); People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Utica City
Ct. 1941); 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS C. XVI, p. 1282-87 (8th ed.,
Carrington, 1927); 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1138 (5th ed. 1911).
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As stated by one authority: "A street is a public way in a much
broader sense than that of a mere way for citizens to pass and repass,
for it is a way under the charge and control of the municipal authorities. ... "23
Granted that the municipality has the right to regulate highways,
does it include the authority to regulate and control parking or stopping of vehicles thereon? The answer, at least- since 1812 when an
English court said that the "king's highway" was "not to be used as a
stable yard,"24 has been that it does. This is probably because parking, whether it was of horse and carriage or automobile, has always
been considered a right inferior to that of travel or passage.26 Practically all the decisions refuse even to classify parking as a right, but
refer to it as a mere privilege.27 Thus it follows that parking is more
easily subjected to the municipal control and regulation than is travel
itself.28 Instances are many where the privilege has been limited, restricted or even prohibited; and the municipal authority appears, in
the absence of gross indiscretion, to be unlimited.29 An indication of
its scope can possibly be ascertained from one state supreme court
ilecision which asserted: "A parking ordinance is nothing more than a
police regulation which settles the matter between the owner of the
automobile and the city."30 The United States Supreme Court dis31
missed without opinion an appeal from this decision.
If the authority of the municipality to regulate and control its highways and barking thereon is recognized, there appears to be little merit
in the contention that the inherent rights of the public to the free
and unobstructed use of the highways are unlawfully violated .or in23. ELLIOT, THE' LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS

21 (2d ed. 1900).

24.
Rex. v.
3 Camp. Rep.v. (1812).
25..See,
e.g.,Cross,
Commonwealth
Fenton, 139 Mass. 195, 29 N.E. 653 (1885);
City of Newark v. Local Government Board of New Jersey, 133 N.J.L. 513, 45
A.2d 139 (1945); Allen & Reed v. Presbrey, 50 R.I. 53, 14 Atl. 888 (1929); Village
of Wonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W. 755 (1930); 8 MCQUILLAX, MU NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.641 (3d ed. 1949).
26. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673, 685
(1948); City of Newark v. Local Government Board of New Jersey, 133
1N.J.L. 513, 45 A.2d 139, 141 (1945). See also Note, 22 IowA L. REV. 713, 714
(1937).
27. See note 26 supra. See also Village of Wonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73,
233 N.W. 755 (1930).
28. "The right of passage is subject only to reasonable regulation by the
municipality for the public good. The right to park on the other hand is merely
a privilege... and may be entirely prohibited." Note, 22 IowA L. REv. 713, 715
(1937).
29. See, e.g., Chicago v. Foley, 355 Ill. 584, 167 N.E. 779 (1929); State v.
Burkett, 119 Md. 609, 87 Atl. 514 (1913); Allen & Reed v. Presbrey, 50 R.I. 53,
144 Atl. 888 (1929); Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688
.(1947). For a general discussion of the power of the municipality over its
streets and highways, see Notes, 27 ILL. L. REv.'212 (1937), 17 ORE. L. REV. 126
-(1937).
30. Allen & Reed v. Presbrey, 50 R.I. 53, 144 Atl. 888, 889 (1929), appeal
dismissed, 280 U. S. 518 (1929).
31. See note 30 supra.
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fringed by the installation of parking meters. The municipality has the
right to impose parking regulations and the correlative right to enforce them in any reasonable manner.3 Whether it chooses to enforce
them by the use of traffic policemen or by "mechanical policemen" in
the form of parking meters should make little difference.3 A few early
decisions 34 reveal a hesitancy to admit this in so many words, but the
intervening years, which have seen parking problems and parking
meters grow apace, have served to transform that early hesitancy into
forthright acknowledgment.3
Despite this judicial approval, a word of caution is called for at this
point. Though the privilege of parking is controllable and subject to
regulation under the municipal police power, this exercise of the police
power must be both reasonable and necessary. 36 Therefore, especially
where parking meters are involved, in the regulation imposed, the
municipality should first establish by survey or other means that the.
streets or districts are in need of such regulatory measures. If it fails
to do this, there is the very real possibility that a challenging litigant
may be able to show that the streets or districts were not in need of
such severe regulation and the regulation could be upset. 37 If mere
32. See, e.g., City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673 (1948);

Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943); State v.

Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97 (1952); Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501,
51 A.2d 836 (1947); City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493
(1953); City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N.Y. 258, 100 N.E. 798 (1913).
33. City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So. 2d 673, 685 (1948); City
of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952). See Note, 17 ORs.
L. REV. 126, 131 (1937).
34. City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson.Realty Co., 233 Ala.- 352, 172
So. 114 (1937); Deaderick v. Parker, 211 Ark. 394, 200 S.W.2d 787 (1947) (because of failure to adopt the ordinance by initiative and referendum); Brodkey
v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940) (revenue measure); Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940) (ordinance void
without express and special legislation); City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La.
.615, 194 So. 566 (1939); M. H. Rhodes v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d
389 (1940) (no express legislative authority); In re Opinion to the House of
Representatives, 62 R. I. 347, 5 A.2d 455 (1939) (power to regulate and control
traffic did not include power to impose a fee or charge for parking).
35. Compare, for example, the attitudes of the North Carolina Supreme
Court in M. H. Rhodes v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940), with
State v. Scoggin, 236 N.E. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97 (1952). Implicit in the Louisiana
and Rhode Island decisions cited note 34 supra, is the inference that, if expressly granted authority to install the metters, their use would be valid. That
has been done in Rhode Island, where the meters are now widely used. It
may be interesting to compare the language used by the courts in some of the
early decisions cited note 85 infra with that used in some of the recent decisions, such as City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 173 Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222
(1952); City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952).
36. See note 22 supra. See also Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So.
314 (1936); M. H. Rhodes v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940);
Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937); City of Galveston v. Galveston County, 159 S.W.2d 976 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The question depends on
the use made of the street. If very little traffic, the public interest is not served
by the installation of parking meters and under such circumstances would be
unconstitutional. See County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va.
381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
37. See cases cited note 36 supra.
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restrictions and regulations not involving parking meters can be successfully contested where they are shown to be unnecessary, 38 there
seems to be no doubt that the courts will even more closely scrutinize
the traffic situation where the meters are involved and hold the ordinance authorizing them unconstitutional as representing an unlawful
exercise of the police power unless the necessity for such strict traffic
regulation is established.3 9
A more serious problem is confronted, however, in the case of parking meter ordinances that do not expressly limit the parking motorist
to only one "coin-deposit period. '40 This problem has been virtually
ignored by almost every writer who has discussed the parking meter
question. This possibly reflects a failure to keep in mind the underlying factor authorizing meter installation, i.e., that the municipality
by traffic survey or otherwise has found it necessary to call into play
its police powers to restrict and limit parking in certain areas to a
certain length of time. That this power must be used reasonably and
without discrimination is too well settled to doubt.41 Where it is used
to permit the municipality to install parking meters, the argument is
that in the interests of the public safety and traffic on the highways
each motorist is limited to parking thereon to the length of the particular time limit imposed. 42 Public and traffic necessity which authorizes the meters in the first instance demands that limit. However,
where there is no restriction on coin renewals it becomes possible for
the first parker to violate the police power limit and monopolize the
particular space for as long as he desires by merely depositing additional coins. 43 Moreover, he-is being allowed to buy up and use parking

44
rights belonging to other motorists.
The parking meter ordinance, if it is found to be discriminatory or to
allow discrimination in favor of certain motorists, could no doubt be

38. E.g., Bergen v. Littman, 193 Misc. 40, 85 N.Y.S.2d 48 (City Ct. 1948);

Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N.Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dep't 1931),
and cases cited therein.
39. See, e.g., Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); State v.
Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97 (1952); Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355,

65 P.2d 1015 (1937); see County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va.
381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
40. See, e.g., Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371, 378 (1945); State v.

Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97, 103, 104 (1952); Kimmel v. City of Spokane,
7 Wash.2d 372, 109 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1941); County Court of Webster v. Roman,
121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1939)

(dissenting opinion).

41. State v. Scoggin, supra note 39 at 102, and cases cited therein. See also
7 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs 688

(3d ed. 1949).

42. See State v. Scoggin, supra note 39 at 104. This opinion contains an excellent discussion of the problem herein concerned.
43. E.g., State v. Scoggin, supra note 39 at 104. See also County Court of
Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1939), which
contains a thought stimulating discussion in a dissenting opinion. Kimmel V.
City of Spokane, 7 Wash.2d 372, 109 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1941).
44. See, e.g., State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. E, 72 S.E.2d 97, 104 (1952). But see
Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945).
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declared unconstitutional. 45 Yet, there are ordinances which by allowing renewal-coin motorists to buy up and monopolize the equal
46
rights of others, permit just that result.
I. OWNERS OF ABUTTING LAND
There is little dissent from the view that the abutting landowner has
not only the right to the free and unobstructed use of the street and
highway in common with other members of the public, but has certain
additional rights. 47 These stem from the relationship of his land to the
street itself and are principally rights of ingress and egress, 48 to load
and unload,49 to the light and air over the highway o and to a clear and
unobstructed view of his premises from the street.51 These rights
exist whether the fee to the street or highway is in the municipality or
in the abutting landowner to the center of the street.52 Moreover, regardless of how they are described it is definitely established that they
are as "sacred from legislative invasion" as the right to the land itself.53
As might be anticipated, however, the~e rights can be regulated and
restricted within reasonable limits in the better interests of the rights
of the public to the use of the streets.54 Otherwise, as was stated by one
court, 55 if they were to be considered absolute and free from regulation, there would be little, if any, parking on the streets except by the
abutting property owners. Hence, under the police power which authorizes the regulation and control of traffic, the municipality can pass
ordinances or parking restrictions which will, in effect, regulate and
restrict the rights of the abutting property owners. 56 As was said by
45. See note 41 supra. The constitutional provisions applicable in Tennessee

would be U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1 and TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
46. "This will not suffice for the lawfullness of parking cannot be made to
depend upon the amount of money deposited in the meter. The maximum
length of time the motorist may leave his vehicle standing in a parking space
on a public street must be fixed by law." State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72
S.E.2d 97, 104 (1952).
47. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 493 (Casner ed., 1952); 3 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 423 (5th ed. 1911).

48. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 494 (Casner ed., 1952); 10 McQUILLAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.63 (3d ed. 1949); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
605 (3d ed. 1939).

49. Eisenmann v. Tester, 191 N.E. 839 (Ohio App. 1934).
50. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 494 (Casner ed., 1952); 10 McQUILLAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.65 (3d ed. 1949); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 607
(3d ed. 1939).
51. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 495 (Casner ed., 1952).

52. Tennessee has long recognized these rights. Frater v. Hamilton County,
90 Tenn. 661, 19 S.W. 233 (1891); Sharber v. City of Nashville, 27 Tenn. App.

625, 183 S.W.2d 777 (M.S. 1944).
53. See 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1123 (5th ed. 1911). Constitutional protection is afforded for these interests by Tennessee law. See note
45 supra.
54. See 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1125, 1138 (5th ed. 1911). See
also Note, 29 VA..L. REv. 617 (1943).
55. Gilsey Buildings, Inc. v. Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945,

11 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
56. In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E.2d 179 (1937); see
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the Tennessee Supreme Court: "The exercise of the police power,
otherwise valid and constitutional cannot be defeated because property
rights are taken or destroyed. '57 That view is everywhere accorded
judicial recognition and sanction. 58
The municipality's power to control and regulate, if it involves the
installation and utilization of parking meters, does not then appear to
be diminished in any substantial respect by the conflicting rights of the
abutting landowners. It is true that if the abutting owners can show
that the meters have been installed in areas not requiring police regulation, the ordinance promulgating installation can be overthrown,5

9

60
but this attack is not limited to the abutting owners.
Although paid scant attention by the commentators, it appears from
the decisions that one of the more substantial contentions alleging
violation of property rights can originate from the abutting owner or
lessee who is also a merchant.6 1 Perhaps the clearest and most convincing support for this statement is in the words of Fox, J., dissenting
in County Court of Webster County v. Roman:

"An abutting property owner has, of course, no special rights in the
street which passes his door; the rights of those who travel thereon are
paramount; but he does have the right, in common with all others, to the
free use thereof, a right which is undoubtedly infringed when anyone is
permitted for a money consideration, to monopolize the right to park a
car for any particular length of time. For example a merchant owning
and occupying a building is entitled to reasonable access thereto, which
access may, under a parking meter system, under some conditions, be
practically destroyed; whereas, under the general power of regulation,
provision could always be made for reasonable ingress and egress."6 2
When the fact that there are parking meter ordinances which do not
limit the number of coins that can be deposited as "renewals" is taken
City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673, 686 (1948); Garner v.
City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135, 137-138 (1943); Andrews v. City
of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1943); Allsmiller v. Johnson, 309
Ky. 695, 218 S.W.2d 28, 29 (1949); Hickey v. -Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371,
372 (1945); Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688, 689 (1947);
see 48 HARV. L.REV. 339 (1934).
57. Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688, 689 (1947), quoting
Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 79, 290 S.W. 608, 611
(1927).

58. See, e.g., cases cited note 56 supra. See also 7 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL
§ 927
(3d ed. 1939).
59. This proposition is implicit in the holdings, for example, in the cases

CoRPORATioNs §§ 24.641, 30.58 (3d ed. 1939); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

cited note 39 supra.

60. The interest of a motorist, or the public in general as represented by a
county or municipal commission can also contest installation as being unnecessary or unreasonable. See, e.g., City of Galveston v. Galveston County,
159 S.W.2d 976 (Tex.Civ. App. 1942).

61. See the thought-provoking language used by the New York court in

discussing the property rights of abutting landowners and merchants in
Reining v. New York, L. & W. Ry., 13 N.Y. Supp. 238 (Superior Ct. 1891).
62. 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1939).
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into consideration, these words of Judge Fox set forth a very forceful
grievance. This is especially so if allowing the renewal deposit results
in hindrance or exclusion of the abutting merchant's customers because
of inability to park within reasonable access of his place of business. 63
Despite this problem, however, the courts are now unanimous in
holding that the installation of parking meters does not violate the
rights of the abutting landowners or merchants to such an unreasonable extent as to warrant judicial intervention. 64 At least one decision
held that they did, City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty
Co.,65 but this decision has not been followed. 66

III. PARKING METERS AS A MUNICIPAL REVENUE-RAISING MEASURE
There is no doubt that one of the major obstacles which must be
overcome by the municipality is the argument that parking meters are
a revenue-raising device.67 The fundamental problem is, of course,
that the parking meter, which is based upon the municipality's unwritten police power, is a regulatory measure whereas revenue meas-

ures must stem from the general legislative powers expressly granted.6 8
Therefore, the municipality cannot utilize its police power to obtain
municipal revenues and any attempt to do so will be quickly upset as
unconstitutional municipal action.69
63. This argument could be advanced in Tennessee, on the basis of the
language of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Sharber v. City of Nashville, 27
Tenn. App. 625, 183 S.W.2d 777, 778 (M.S. 1944), which indicates an eager
intention on the part of the court to protect the rights of abutting owners.
Also pertinent are the words of Fox, J., dissenting in County Court of Webster
County v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1939). See Note,
Validity of Parking Meter Ordinances, 29 VA. L. REV. 617, 624 (1943), the
author of which wbuld possibly agree.
64. See, e.g., cases cited note 56 supra.
65. 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114, 108 A.L.R. 1140 (1937), 22 MINN. L. REV. 111,
16 TEXAS L. REV. 104.
66. The Alabama court refused to follow the City of Birmingham v. HoodMcPherson rule in City of Decattur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673
(1948).
67. Most of the cases involve the contention that the metters constitute a
revenue measure. 1 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
144, 145 (1948); 10 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.58 (3d ed. 1939).
But see Grimes, The Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and Permissible
Use of ParkingMeter Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1947).
68. See Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943);
for an excellent discussion and collection of cases, see Foster's, Inc. v. Boise
City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941); Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305
Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1943).
69. Although the only instance of an ordinance which represented a revenue
measure failing is in Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 191 N.W. 171 (1940),
it is a cardinal rule that if the ordinance is shown to constitute a revenue
measure, it will be struck down. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 69; Glodt
v. City of Missoula, 121 Mont. 178, 190 P.2d 545 (1948); Hickey v. Riley, 177
Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945); Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32
A.2d 881 (1943). The power of the municipality to regulate and control
highways is a result of delegation to it by the state of state police power. The
power to impose a tax or revenue measure on the other hand is not included
in a delegation of power to control and regulate highways and requires a
separate delegation of authority. TENN. CONST. Art. II, § 29. See also, 2
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This does not mean, however, that in exercising its police power and
irhposing regulations the municipality cannot impose, along with the
regulation, a fee or charge. It is well settled that it can do so.
"Effective exercise of the police power necessarily involves expenditures
in many ways. The means and instrumentalities, by and through which the
supervising powers of the policing authority are brought on the subject
to be regulated, involve costs and expenses. It is only reasonable and fair
to require the business, traffic, act, or thing that necessitates policing, to
pay this expense. To do so has uniformly been upheld by the courts."7 0
The problem then is whether the fee or charge required by the parking meters amounts to a revenue measure and hence becomes illegal.
There is no clear-cut distinction, in definitive words at least, as to when
the charge is for regulation or for revenue, but the usual limitation
used by the courts is that it is valid under the police regulation if intended as a regulatory charge and if the revenue realized from the
meters is not too disproportionate to the cost of regulation. 71 This is of
little help in differentiating between the regulatory charge and the
revenue charge concept, however, because although these decisions pay
homage to that definition, it appears that the restrictions inherent
within it are indeed slight. For example, in Miami, Florida, the proceeds of the meters have totalled $51,000 for a ten month period, 2 and
3
in Kansas the net revenue for 1950 was $45,488.75.7
Where will the courts draw the line and hold that the net surplus
derived from meters is so large as to constitute a revenue measure?
Is it possible that the courts have lost sight of the basis underlying
the authority for the charge, to defray the cost of installation, upkeep
and enforcement? Apparently some courts 74 have either done exactly
that; or, the net surplus has not reached the danger point, which is evi1230 (8th ed. 1927); 4 COOLEY, TAXATION
3386 (4th ed. 1924).
70. Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941).
71. See, e.g., Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943);
Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889 (1943); Glodt v.
City of Missoula, 121 Mont. 178, 190 P.2d 545 (1948); Opinion of the Justices,
.94 N.H. 501, 51 A.2d 836 (1947); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371
(1945); Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A.2d 881 (1943). See
also, 1 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 144-45
(1948); Note, Validity of ParkingMeter Ordinances, 29 VA. L. REV. 617 (1943);
18 IND. L.J. 324 (1943); 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 58 (1945). On the other hand,
lack of excess or even sufficient funds to cover costs will not invalidate the
ordinance. Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 58 S.E.2d 815 (1950).
72. See Note, 22 IowA L. REV. 713 n.55, 57 (1937). A similar problem was
discussed in Clark v. City of New Castle, 32 Pa. D. & C., 30 Mun. 65 (1939).
73. Discussed in City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 173 Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222
(1952).
74. See, e.g., City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952).
Evidence was admitted to show that a large surplus of collections over costs
existed. Said the court, "The excess, though impressive, ,is consistent with
sound fiscal policy." 242 P.2d at 494.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
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75
dently extremely high.
It would seem that after the initial cost of the meter is met and before new meters are needed there will be a preponderance of receipts
over the cost of the upkeep of the meters, inspection, and so forth.76
The regulatory charge was originally imposed to assist the municipality in enforcing the time parking restrictions by helping to defray
the costs of the "mechanical policemen". "employed" for that purpose. 7
When the municipality begins to realize a sizeable surplus, the need
for the police power regulation and enforcement still exists, but is the
imposition of the original regulatory charge justified? It would seem
that when the money received is in excess of the necessary regulatory
costs, the charge should be lowered or temporarily suspended. There
are no instances of this having been done, possibly because of a failure
of the challenging litigant to adequately raise the question; instead,
the surplus money is used to defray the costs of general highway improvements, controls and regulations, which in most instances are not
connected with the metered streets.78 It appears to the writer that
when such is done, the municipality is not following the purpose authorizing and validating the imposition of the original charge, and it is
dangerously close to performing its general legislative duties with police power receipts. The fee is not to prohibit or deter parking, it is
to defray the costs of enforcing the parking time restrictions caused by
use of the parking meters.79 The availability of a large surplus for
general highway expenditures, not connected with those costs, should,
in itself, be strong evidence that the same rate of charge is no longer
necessary. 80
The courts sanctioned the imposition of the fee only when it was
related proportionately to that for which it was imposed. 81 Did they
mean to say that the reason for the charge was to aid in defraying the
costs of general traffic and highway improvements and regulation, or,

75. In Lansing, Michigan, the revenues for he two years preceding 1949

were averaging $83,404.19 per year or $98.23 per meter. PARKING FOR SMALLER
CITIES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72. But see the language of the Michigan court
in Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1943).

76. The average income per meter, per year in 1943, in 316 cities was $62.00
per meter. Servicing costs, collection and repairs average about 10 percent of
that sum. PARKNG FOR SMALLER CITIES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72. Oklahoma
City's meters paid for themselves within 60 days. 22 IowA L. REv. 713 n.55-57
(1937).
77. Probably the clearest judicial treatments of the purpose of the fee, and
expenditures in general are to be found in Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho
201, 118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941); State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97, 102

(1952).

78. See PARKING FOR SMALLER Crr
iE S, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73.
79. See, e.g., Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943);
People v. Littman, 193 Misc. 40, 85 N.Y.S.2d 48 (City Ct. 1948); Hickey v.
Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945); Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash.2d
372, 109 P.2d 1069 (1941).
80. See, e.g., Hendricks v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428
(1940); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945).
81. See notes 79, 80 supra.
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did they mean only to aid in defraying the costs of the meters, their
installation, upkeep and patrolling? There is no doubt that most of
the courts implied that their approval of the charge was based on the
latter type of expenditures. 2 A number of courts have, however, confused the types of expenditures, 83 and a few have added to the chaos by
84
losing sight of the real purpose of the parking meter itself.
Retrospectively, it would have been a hazardous assertion to state
that surplus funds realized from the meters could be used for the costs
of painting crosswalks, pedestrian waiting stations, traffic stanchions,
and so forth, on distant unmetered streets. 85 Today, that such expenditures are permissible appears to be the rule in most jurisdictions. 6
Thus the line between a fee imposed under the police power and an
unconstitutional revenue measure imposed under the same power is
all but obliterated. The reason and justification for the charge in most
instances has been neatly camouflaged by judicial precedent.
It should be noted, that to date, the "revenue" attacks upon the parking meters have involved meters installed under a delegated police
authority from the state. What if the meters were to be installed under
an express delegation of taxing powers? It is unsettled whether an attempt by the municipality to install meters under the power to tax
would be valid. Only one case denying constitutionality can be said
to be pertinent, although it is easily distinguishable 87 and is based primarily on dicta from cases concerned with delegated police power. If
permissible, the judicial restrictions applicable to "police power meters" would be avoided and the "tax meters" would then permit the
municipality to raise revenue as well as regulate. Research has failed,
however, to discover any additional authority indicating whether or
not such a delegation and tax could be constitutionally effectuated.
It is submitted that the questions posed herein in regard to the re82. See note 80 supra, and Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33
A.2d 142 (1943) (containing an excellent collection of pertinent cases).
83. Compare the judicial attitudes in City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 173
Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222 (1952); City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242
P.2d 493 (1952), with those expressed in cases cited notes 79, 80 supra.
84. Is it the fee imposed or the police power regulation that is to control
parking? See Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A.2d 836, 839 (1947). Can
the raising of revenue to finance general traffic control be a secondary but yet
important purpose behind the parking meter ordinance? See Grimes, The
Legality of Parking Meter Ordinances and Permissible Use of Parking Meter
Funds, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1947). Compare this view with 1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 27 (4th ed. 1924), cited and discussed in 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1939).
See also 1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 26 et seq. (4th ed 1924).
85. See, e.g., Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314, 316, 317 (1936);
Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889, 892 (1943); Glodt
v. City of Missoula, 121 Mont. 178, 190 P.2d 545, 548, 549 (1948); M. H. Rhodes
Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1940); Ex parte Duncan,
179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015, 1017, 1018 (1937).
86. See 1 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 144
et seq. (1948); PARKING FOR SMALLER CITIES, op. cit. supra note 1 at 73.

87. Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940).
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newal of coin deposits, 88 assessment of parking meter charges and expenditures of funds realized 89 merit the attention of the traffic boards
and commissions responsible for installation and upkeep of the meters.
They have seldom been directly posed to the courts, but where they
have, there are implications in the resulting decisions that make them
worthy of consideration, in other jurisdictions.

IV. SOME RELATED QUEsTIONS
In addition to the aforementioned, there are several other questions
which are worthy of mention. Of these, the most significant involves
the question of whether a general-delegation-of-authority statute by

the state to the municipality, to regulate and control highways and
traffic includes the power to install parking meters.90 Another concerns
the delegation by the state or municipality of the zones to their traffic
boards or commissions as involving an unlawful delegation of legislative discretion and police powers. 91 Another question is whether there
is a contracting away of the municipality's discretionary and governmental powers when the contract for the purchase, installation and
payment is to extend beyond the term of office of the traffic board or
other authorizing body.92
The courts have encountered and considered these objections, and
today there is little doubt that the decisions are practically all in accord
in denying them. There is evident in many of the decisions, however,
a note of hesitancy and qualification precedent to denial, and for this
reason they have been considered worthy of at least passing acknowledgment. There are, of course, various other objections 93 which have
88. State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97, 103, 104 (1952).
89. See cases cited notes 79, 80 supra.

90. Compare City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852
(1942); Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940); M. H.
Rhodes, Inc., v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E.2d 389 (1940); Ex parte
Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937); In re Opinion to the House of
Representatives, 62 R.I. 347, 5 A.2d 455 (1939), with Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A.2d 142 (1943); Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga.
800, 58 S.E.2d 815 (1950); Miller v. City of Georgtown, 301 Ky. 241, 191 S.W.2d
403 (1945) City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952); County
Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E..2d 631 (1939). See
also 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
91. See, e.g., Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940),
rehearing denied, 296 N.W. 352 (1941). See also 7 McQUILLAN, MUNIcIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 24.642 (3d ed. 1949).
92. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Town of Graham v.
Karpark Corp., 194 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1952).
93. See e.g., Deaderick v. Parker, 211 Ark. 394, 200 S.W.2d 787 (1947) (meter
charge was illegal exaction because ordinance was not adopted by initiative
and referendum); Asbell v. Lahan, 158 Fla. 72, 27 So.2d 667 (1946) (meter
charge was an attempt to exact payment from users of street); Gardner v. City
of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135 (1943) (meter ordinance discriminatory because only applied to certain streets); Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63
Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941) (fee was tax on right to use streets); Stephens
v. City of Russell, 306 Ky. 727, 209 S.W.2d 81 (1948) (ordinance discriminated
against persons with vehicles over 20 feet long); City of Louisville v. Louis-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 6

been posed but their failure to command any appreciable judicial
recognition precludes their inclusion herein.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since 1936, at least 34 states94 have been confronted with the question
of the constitutionality of the parking meter. Although there were
some early contra decisions, 95 the courts are now unanimous in upholding their use.96 Despite the formidable array of judicial approval,
however, one cannot help but detect within many of the decisions the
same note of cautiousness that was reflected in the earlier decisions.
Qualifications and restrictions as to reasonableness, revenue-raising
and improper discrimination are ever present and the rights of the
97
abutting landowners are more alive than one might be led to believe.
It is granted that there are some recent decisions 98 which reflect a
ville Automobile Club, 290 Ky. 241, 160 S.W.2d 663 (1942) (meter constituted

nuisance and statute discriminatory in that fine for overparking on metered

streets was one dollar, on nonmetered streets five dollars); Hendricks v. City.
of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940) (ordinance allowing illegal
appropriation of municipal funds for private persons); People v. Baxter, 32
N.Y.S.2d 320 (Utica City Ct. 1941) (motorist violates ordinance whenever he
parks when meter flag time is out; ordinance should have allowed time to get
change); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945) (discriminates
against horse drawn vehicles, and in favor of rich as against poor).
94. City of Decatur v. Robinson, 251 Ala. 99, 36 So.2d 673 (1948); Deaderick
v. Parker, 211 Ark. 394, 200 S.W.2d 787 (1947); Deayran v. City of San Diego,
75 Cal. App.2d 292, 170 P.2d 482 (1946); Cassidy v. City of Waterbury,
130 Conn. 199, 33 A.2d 142 (1943); Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171
So. 314 (1036); Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E.2d 135
(1943); Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941); City of
Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852 (1942); Andrews v. City
of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E.2d 968 (1943); Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229
Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940); City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 173 Kan. 18,
244 P.2d 222 (1952); City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club, 290
Ky. 241, 160 S.W.2d 663 (1942); Monsour v. City of Shreveport, 194 La. 625,
194 So. 569 (1940); In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E.2d 179
(1937); Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889 (1943);
Hendricks v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940); Wilhoit v.
City of Springfield, 273 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.E.2d 95 (1943); Glodt v. City of
Missoula, 121 Mont. 178, 191 P.2d 545 (1948); Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H.
501, 51 A.2d 836 (1947); City of Newark v. Local Government Board of New
Jersey, 133 N.J.L. 513, 45 A.2d 139 (1945); City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 56 N.M.
201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952); People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Utica City Court
1941); State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97 (1952); State v. Brekke, 75
N.D. 468, 8 N.W.2d 598 (1947); City of Columbus v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522,
31 N.E.2d 142 (1940); Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015 (1937);
Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945); Laubach & Sons v. City
of Easton, 347 Pa. 452, 32 A.2d 881 (1943); In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 62 R.I. 347, 5 A.2d 455 (1939); Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260,
8 S.E.2d 339 (1940); Porter v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688
(1947); Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W.2d 743 (Tex Civ. App. 1937);
Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash.2d. 373, 109 P.2d 1069 (1941); County
Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E.2d 631 (1939).
95. See note 34 supra.
96. See note 87 supra.
97. See, e.g., Sharber v. City of Nashville, 27 Tenn. App. 625, 183 S.W.2d 777
(1944). See also cases cited supra notes 52, 56.
98. City of Hutchinson v. Harris, 173 Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222 (1952); Opinion
of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A.2d 836 (1947); City of Roswell v. Mitchell,
56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493 (1952).
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position contrary to that just expressed, but, with all due respect, it is
submitted that in most instances it appears that the court concerned
has failed to grasp the real purpose and legal justification for the installation of the parking meters and imposition of the fee. Necessity,
not the need of revenue for general highway control purposes, justifies
the exercise of the police power to authorize the imposition of such
strict parking regulation, as is represented by the parking meter.
Some of the decisions reflect a failure to realize this fact and, as a result, a reading of them is apt to lead the unwary municipal traffic
board or commission into believing that the right to install parking
meters is an absolute municipal prerogative, free from question by the
abutting landowner, motorist or taxpayer. A moment's consideration
of the real reason for the parking meter should be sufficient to cause
them to realize, however, that there are still several strong objections
that can be raised. 99 While apparently kinetic, they are yet potential:
99. For a recent example, see State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 72 S.E.2d 97

(1952).

